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Emotion perception and mental retardation: an overview
ABSTRACT
Many studies have reported that children and adults with cultural-familial retardation have 
problems with tasks involving the recognition of emotions. On the basis of these findings 
Rojahn, Rabold & Schneider (1995) have proposed that people with mental retardation suffer 
from a specific deficit in emotion perception. This paper proposes that the case for emotion 
specificity is not as compelling as Rojahn et al propose and presents alternative conceptual 
models that may serve as useful aids when designing and appraising future studies, and in 
thinking about clinical interventions in this area.
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INTRODUCTION
Individuals with cultural familial mental retardation frequently have impairments in social 
skills, have difficulties in adjusting socially and vocationally, and often develop additional 
psychopathology. What are the root causes of these social adaptive problems? Are they a 
consequence of impaired intellectual functioning and poor information processing capacities 
or are other factors involved?
A number of researchers have reported that in addition to general social skills problems, 
individuals with mental retardation also appear to have problems with emotion perception. 
Rojahn, Rabold and Schneider (1995) have suggested that there may be a direct causal link 
between emotion perception ‘deficits’ and social adaptive problems. Rojahn et al formulated 
what they call an emotion specificity hypothesis of mental retardation. They propose that, in 
addition to general intellectual impairments, people with mental retardation have domain-
specific emotion perception deficits, and these may be a cause of social adaptive problems
Although a number of studies such as that of Moffat et al (1995) lend some credence to the 
view that there is a link between emotion perception deficits and social adjustment there are a 
number of counter arguments. It is perfectly reasonable, for example, to propose that the link 
is in the opposite direction to that advocated by Rojahn, Rabold and Schneider (1995), and 
that emotion perception deficits are a consequence rather than a cause of social adaptive 
problems (see Sinason, 1992, for a view on this).
Rather than hypothesizing that basic emotion perception is impaired, Moore (in press) has 
proposed that such capacities may be relatively intact in individuals with mental retardation. 
For some time Ecological Psychology has proposed that social perception has been wrongly 
viewed as a top-down cognitive, inferential process. It should not be assumed that humans 
employ the same processes in perceiving people as they do in perceiving objects. For 
example: Baron (1980) has proposed that “...there is a certain amount of species level 
preparedness for the perceptual systems of higher primates to resonate to information relevant 
to social interaction." (p 594). Ecological Psychologists argue that because social perception 
is of great importance for human adaptation, perceptual architecture dedicated to perceiving 
social meanings may have evolved specifically for this purpose. Consequently there is no 
reason to suppose that these capacities relate to or are constrained by general cognitive 
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capacities and IQ.
Cognitive psychology has also recognized that there may be relatively direct, bottom-up, 
input driven, encapsulated, perceptual mechanisms which operate independently of more 
general cognitive processes (Fodor, 1983). These modular and/or domain-specific1 cognitive 
mechanisms may provide basic social meanings to the observer. Recent work with infants has 
lead to a reappraisal of certain aspects of early social perception. For example, it has been 
proposed that in the perception of faces, and the interpretation of the causal and goal-directed 
actions of agents, infants may employ modular mechanisms attuned to specific perceptual 
patterning (Gergely et al., 1995; Premack, 1990; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Carey & Spelke., 
1994; Morton & Johnson., 1991).  Others have proposed that the understanding of the 
emotional meanings manifest in the ‘bodies’ of others may involve innate, bottom-up 
perceptual capacities, and that the accessibility of this information to the infant is of central 
importance in facilitating and maintaining social-communicative development. For example 
see Hobson, 1993; Reddy et al, 1997.  
Although these proposals do not preclude individuals with mental retardation from having 
deficits in these areas of functioning2, Moore’s (in press) suggestion that low-level social-
perceptual capacities are intact in individuals with mental retardation fits well with theories of 
domain specificity and/or modularity. In fact, a recent study has shown that when compared 
to mental-age-matched typically developing controls, mentally retarded children have spared 
capacities for remembering faces in comparison to relatively impaired abilities for 
remembering objects (Dobson & Rust, 1994). Similarly, Moore, Hobson & Anderson (1995) 
have demonstrated that individuals with mental retardation have spared abilities in the 
perception of human bodily movements, in contrast with specific impairments in other 
information processing capacities (see also Anderson & Miller, 1998). 
A review by Rojahn, Lederer and Tasse (1995) looked at the methodologies of studies 
1 Note the distinction between modules and domain-specificity. All modules are domain specific, but 
domain-specific capacities need not be modular. See Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and Carey and Spelke 
(1994) for fuller expositions of these issues.
2 Modularity in cognitive function may not necessarily be represented in localized neurological 
structures. Neural pathways involved in the implementation of these processes may be distributed 
throughout the brain and consequently may be affected by general synaptic or neuronal impairments.
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investigating the emotion recognition capacities of mentally retarded people, and concluded 
that to address this issue properly studies must have an adequate control task and include 
mental age matched control participants. These are extremely important design elements of 
these types of studies. However, it is also important, even when control tasks and mental 
matching are employed, to consider any findings in relation to the IQ-related demands of the 
tasks, and to consider the type and validity of the stimuli employed. It is the contention here 
that in their review, Rojahn et al  (1995) did not fully consider these important design issues.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
When one begins to look at studies done in this area one begins to find that many studies of 
emotion recognition suffer from a confusion of terminology, interpretation and method. To 
this end, it is not only necessary to reassess the theoretical accounts given for each study but it 
is also necessary to see if studies have all the necessary elements of experimental design in 
place to enable one to determine whether or not a reported deficit is perceptually based, 
emotion- specific and whether or not it is related to mental age or general intelligence (IQ). 
Similar analyses have proven useful when considering the nature of emotion perception in 
individuals with autism (Hobson, 1991) and in children with specific learning disabilities 
(Maheady, Harper & Sainto, 1987).
Ecological validity
The first point to bear in mind when setting out to assess a capacity for perceiving certain 
forms of information, is whether the stimuli used to measure such an ability are truly 
representative of the domain in question. If they are not, any deficit in performance may not 
be specific to the domain one is intending to study, but may be related exclusively to 
processes involved in 'perceiving' and understanding any one of a number of aspects of the 
particular stimuli employed. These criticisms can be applied to a number of studies 
undertaken in this area, in particular those using schematic drawings or cartoons which do not 
reflect real human expressions and may represent some type of learned ‘emotional shorthand’. 
Even the use of stimuli of apparently high ecological validity such as photographs of faces 
may lead to ungeneralizable findings because of the lack of dynamic movement (Moore et al, 
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1997).
Participant selection and matching
In relation to chronologically equivalent non-retarded individuals, mentally retarded children 
not only differ in IQ (the variable that defines each diagnostic group), but also in Mental 
Age3. When comparisons are made between groups of children with and without mental 
retardation who are not equivalent in Mental Age (MA), one cannot be certain that any 
differences found in performance between these groups arise because of differences in 
capacities to execute the process of interest, namely emotion perception, or whether task 
performance is due to mentally retarded participants' impaired capacities to cope with the 
demands of the task itself. For example, performance may relate to abilities to verbally label 
or match any type of stimuli regardless of their emotional content. Thus, one needs to be sure 
that the groups of individuals with and without mental retardation are equivalent in their 
abilities to cope with these secondary components of the task. 
One step towards determining whether the two groups are equally capable of coping with 
task-related demands is to match for Mental Age. Although matching groups for MA does not 
mean that both groups will have exactly the same cognitive structures (Weiss et al, 1986), and 
there may still be differences in cognitive competence even after matching, it does mean that 
any potential differences in performance cannot be attributed to differences in the capacity to 
perform some functions related to knowledge acquisition involved in doing sub-tasks on an 
IQ test. Of course matching for MA means that under some circumstances individuals with 
mental retardation may have advantages because of having higher chronological ages (CAs), 
although it would be difficult to specify what these advantages might be. Additionally one has 
to consider whether the matching is on measures which test verbal or non-verbal cognitive 
abilities. If two groups are matched for non-verbal MA, but the target task relies on verbal 
responding, one can not necessarily assume that performance is unrelated to MA. 
Secondary Pathologies
In fact the CA difference may work against individuals with mental retardation. There is an 
3 Mental age could be defined as level of knowledge/skill acquisition, and IQ as rate of acquisition (See 
Anderson 1992)
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issue concerning secondary pathologies. Given that many studies reporting deficits in this 
area have been done with adults, this is a serious consideration. Sinason (1992) talks of 
secondary handicap whereby the stigma associated with being handicapped and consequently 
rejected by society leads in adulthood to withdrawal and detachment from the world. These 
pathologies manifest themselves in incidences of depression and/or behavior problems and 
these may lead to poorer performance on emotion identification tasks. Thus, impaired 
emotion recognition performance may be a consequence rather than a cause of poor social 
adaptation. This is a serious issue when examining work in this area. Studies done with adults 
often yield different results to those done with children, and this needs to be considered.
Task demands
The arrival at a meaningful response involves (at least) two components. The first component 
is determined by capacities in relation to the process under study, in the current case 
capacities for person perception. However, the second component of overall performance is 
the ability of participants to cope with task-specific demands. Even if individuals with mental 
retardation have the same capacities as non-retarded individuals in the first component, it may 
be that they differ in the second.
Thus, an important issue in devising tasks is to work out exactly what demands each task is 
making on the participant over and above the capacity to perceive the emotional content of 
stimuli. Even some seemingly simple tasks require participants not only to perceive a 
stimulus, but also to encode it, discriminate it from others, and verbally respond to it. Moore 
(in press) has attempted to come up with a fine-grained (but by no means exhaustive) 
classification system and this is presented in Table 1. This table splits tasks into five different 
types and gives an indication of some of the demands each task makes on participants. 
Consideration of these issues is of particular importance when assessing studies where no
control tasks have been administered (more on control tasks shortly), as it allows us to 
examine which other aspects (apart from emotion recognition) of the tasks administered may 
account for any differences found between MA-matched groups. Even a fairly simple task 
requiring a participant to look at one picture of a face and then match it to another, by picking 
out the same emotion from a selection of five or six other photographs of faces (called here a 
within-mode matching task), makes significant demands on memory. The participant has to 
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encode the emotion of the first face and hold this in mind as well as the goal - which is to find 
a match. Then the participant has to encode the emotional content of the other faces to which 
the match is to be made, and has to select the match. It is known that in relation to TD 
children, MA-matched individuals with mental retardation have problems with the transfer of 
information out of iconic memory for further processing (see Mosely, 1981). Consequently, 
one has to be circumspect in concluding that it is the emotional content of the stimuli which is 
responsible for deficits in recognition performance. 
[TABLE 1 HERE]
As can be seen from Table 1 all tasks require some memory component even if this is simply 
the process of remembering what one is being asked to do - i.e. to hold in mind the goal of the 
task. Thus one has to be sure that it is not these components of tasks which are responsible for 
differential performance, and this is primary reason for employing control tasks.
Index and control tasks
A critical methodological issue concerns the specificity of an ability or disability, and this is 
central in the selection of the control task one might employ. If one wishes to demonstrate a 
specific impairment or indeed a spared ability  (see Anderson & Miller, 1998), one needs to 
demonstrate, using similar experimental techniques, two things. Firstly, that participants are 
impaired in processing information in the domain in question (i.e. emotion in faces) in 
relation to MA-matched control participants. Secondly, that when mentally retarded 
participants are presented with another task involving the processing of information not 
specific to the domain in question (i.e. age of faces), they are not impaired in relation to the 
matched controls. Together this would demonstrate that performance on the domain-specific 
task is not simply determined by general MA- or IQ-related capacities but is specific to the 
domain in question. However, here we come to a critical issue. This concerns the direct 
comparability of the index and control tasks. The two tasks need to be of equal levels of 
difficulty, and need as far as possible to make the same response demands on each group. The 
concern is how to set up experimental conditions so that in the index task, participants' 
performance is determined primarily by capacities specific to the domain in question. It is 
essential to formulate control tasks which are equivalent in the terms of extraneous demands 
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to the index task, but which do not measure the same target capacities. This is not a 
straightforward undertaking (See Hobson, 1991).
Even if one has covered the two concerns above there is still an additional issue that requires 
consideration. Rather than emphasizing the disadvantages that individuals with mental 
retardation may have in relation to MA-matched controls (for example in terms of poor iconic 
memory), it is also important to stress the advantages typically developing children may have. 
Intelligence, as measured by IQ scores, not only reflects the rate with which individuals 
achieve levels of cognitive competence, but may also reflect general 'mental speed' - the speed 
with which individuals process information. This superior 'mental speed' may allow non-
retarded individuals to process supplementary, peripheral cues more efficiently than MA-
matched individuals with mental retardation (Anderson, 1992). In this case, if an index task is 
not 'restricted' to the perceptual process of interest, then IQ-related information processing 
abilities may improve non-retarded individual's task performance, and mentally retarded 
participants may appear impaired when they are not. As Hobson (1991) put it “...there is a 
danger of creating a setting in which one participant’s intuitive emotional sensitivity might 
confer little advantage over another participant’s emotionally insensitive but cognitively 
effective classification abilities” (p1139).
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
In a review of studies Moore (in press), has revealed that even with cross-culturally validated 
photographs (Ekman & Friesen, 1975), there are no consistent findings of emotion perception 
deficits in individuals with mental retardation in relation to MA-matched non-retarded 
children. On some occasions individuals with mental retardation appeared as able to identify 
emotional expressions in faces as MA-matched non-retarded individuals (Hobson, Ouston & 
Lee, 1989b; Adams & Markham, 1991; Xemeteriou, 1992; Weisman & Brosgole, 1994), and 
at other times they appeared to be relatively impaired (McAlpine et al 1992; Hobson, Ouston 
& Lee, 1989a; Rojahn et al 1995). Table 2 summarizes these findings.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
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The major point is that, apart from the studies of Hobson, Ouston & Lee (1989a&b), Rojahn 
et al (1995) and Moore Hobson & Lee (1997), none of the other studies listed in table 2 
included all the methodological rigors outlined above. Very few studies assessed performance 
across MA-matched groups and even fewer employed control tasks to explore the specificity 
of performance deficits.  Also of note was the number of studies that explored performance in 
adults with mental retardation. Only the studies of Brosgole et al (1986); Adams & Markham 
(1991); McAlpine et al (1992); Xemeteriou, (1992) and Marcell & Jett (1985) looked at the 
phenomenon in children. This point is of particular importance given the possibility that 
secondary pathologies may occur in adults with mental retardation (Sinason, 1992).
It seems that individuals with mental retardation may find the sort of tasks that have been 
used to assess emotion perception more difficult than CA-matched non-retarded individuals, 
and may find them more difficult that MA-matched non-retarded individuals. However, it is 
unclear which aspects of these tasks are problematic, and it is unlikely that these problems 
solely represent an emotion perception deficit. Only one study (Hobson, Ouston and Lee, 
1989a) provided convincing evidence that in relation to MA-matched controls, individuals 
with mental retardation may have a specific, perceptually-based problem with 'identifying' 
photographic representations of emotions. Having said this, this task involved the matching of 
two forms of stimuli (faces and voices), and when the same participants were asked to name 
these stimuli separately (Hobson, Ouston & Lee, 1989b), no emotion specific impairment was 
found. It is possible that the process of matching complex representations may require the use 
of representational or symbolic processes that are IQ-related and that performance may reflect 
restrictions in other information processing abilities, rather than problems in person-
perceptual processes. This view concurs with Weisman & Brosgole (1994) who found that on 
a simple identification task mentally retarded individuals were not impaired in relation to 
MA-matched controls, but with an increase in task complexity, errors increased in relation to 
IQ.
It would appear from these findings that a more elaborate account of the problems found in 
these populations is required. To this end Moore (in press) attempted to highlight further the 
complexities of the issues by giving a graphical account of the factors implicated in these 
tasks (see Figure 1). The diagram shows the influence on performance of the validity of the 
stimuli, secondary pathologies, and the levels of difficulty of index and control tasks. It is the 
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contention here that Rojahn et al (1995) do not fully take into account the possibility that IQ-
related information processing capacities may differ between two groups of MA- matched 
individuals with and without mental retardation. Rojahn et al. assume a direct causal link 
between poor task performance and emotion recognition capabilities, and have underplayed 
the critical part a control task plays in determining the validity of this link.  
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure one gives a graphical explanation of the complex factors that may determine task 
performance and shows how the impaired performance of children with mental retardation on 
emotion perception tasks may not necessarily be causally related to specific impairments in 
understanding of emotions. The critical issue is that without a control task one can not know 
whether or not performance is determined by IQ-related differences between the two groups 
(See Moore, in press for a fuller account of these differences). Figure One also illustrates 
how, even if a specific difference were found on an emotion tasks in comparison with a 
control task of equal level of difficulty, one still needs to consider other factors. One has to 
consider the validity of the stimuli themselves and with older participants, secondary 
handicaps may be involved which may be organic or psychological in origin. Figure 1 does 
not attempt to make every link between the different areas, for example language abilities 
may be related to emotional sensitivity, but is intended to highlight the complexity of the 
issue and this approach may help in designing and assessing future studies in this area.
In summary, it seems that whereas propositions regarding deficits in general social cognition
are supportable, the conclusion that individuals with mental retardation have specific person-
perceptual deficits and in particular emotion-perception deficits, may not be as compelling as 
it first appears (Moore, 1994; Moore et al, 1995; Moore et al 1997, Moore, in press). It may 
be argued that the perceptual problems reported in many studies are in fact task-related
problems, and are a consequence of the methodologies employed rather than of perceptual 
deficits. It may be that individuals with mental retardation are, in fact, as able as typically 
developing children to perceive basic meanings within a social interaction. Performance 
difficulties may arise because of IQ-related deficits in verbalization of relations, iconic 
memory or categorization, all of which may be implicated when responding to complex 
matching tasks (Weiss et al 1986). Analysis of task demands along the lines of those detailed 
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in Table 1 may help in assessing how such deficits affect each type of recognition task and 
allow us to understand the relationship between emotion recognition performance and IQ. 
Without the use of adequate matching and control tasks, and without thorough consideration 
of the validity of the stimuli it is difficult to see how the results of any study can be used to 
make a case for an emotion recognition deficit.
This perspective may help to explain the mixed success in trying to specifically improve 
emotion recognition performance. If, as is suggested here, there is little evidence to suggest 
that emotion sensitivity is specifically impaired, then any improvements in performance on 
these tasks are likely to have been gained through indirect improvements in strategies to 
alleviate IQ-related difficulties in memory and information processing capacities. 
Consequently, training may not necessarily be expected to generalize to real world situations 
where these demands might differ and where, if anything, memory and information 
processing demands are greater. This is not to say that emotion recognition training should 
not be undertaken, just that it should not be assumed that what is being improved is the 
underlying emotional sensitivity of individuals with mental retardation.
In fact, more importantly, the proposal that mentally retarded individuals are as emotionally 
sensitive as typically developing children requires one to address an important clinical issue. 
If individuals with mental retardation are able to identify and consequently experience the 
emotional responses of others, then this in itself may account for the social adaptive problems 
they often have. Individuals with mental retardation will often encounter social stigma and 
negative emotional expressions directed at them by others. Because they are sensitive to these 
negative emotional signals this may lead to low self-esteem and to social withdrawal -or what 
has been termed secondary handicap. This may be an equally valid causal explanation of the 
poor social adaptation found in mentally handicapped individuals (again see Sinason, 1992).
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say the word to 
go with the 
face
Match emotion 










judge face for 
intensity or on 
a scale happy 
to sad
Hold in mind goal ü ü ü ü ü
identify emotion in more 
than one stimulus
û ü ü ü ü
(target and scale)
identify emotion in more 
than one modality
û ü û ü û
employ verbal response ü û û û û
make non-categorical 
judgement
û û û û ü
Table 2: Summary of findings in relation to MA-matched 












Brosgole et al (1986)
(Tasks 1 & 3)
children and 
adults
(6;00) HMR = HNR (5;08*)
(4;11) MMR = MNR (5;02*)
Animal 
identification






(4.3 to 9.3) MR = NR (5.2 to 7.7)  
(7.8-12.8) HMR < HNR (7-12.8)
none
McAlpine et al (1992) children and 
adults
 MR < NR none
Xerometeriou (1992) children (7;08) HMR = HNR (7;09)
(5;01)LMR = LNR (4;08)
none
Weisman & Brosgole 
(1994)
(Cond 1)
adults (5;09) MR=NR (5;07) none
Simon et al (1995) adults No comparable MA group none
Simon et al (1996) adults No comparable MA group none
Rating tasks
Levy et al (1960) adults No comparable MA group none
Rohajn et al (1995) adults MR = NR on emotion faces
MR<NR on neutral faces
Rating of Age
Labelling tasks
Maurer & Newbrough 
(1987)
adults No comparable MA group none
Hobson, Ousten & Lee 
(1989b)
adults (7;01) MR= NR (7;0) labelling of 
objects and 
sounds
McAlpine et al (1991) children and 
adults
No comparable MA group none




Gray et al (1983) young adults No comparable MA group none
Marcell & Jett (1985) children and 
adolescents
(5.7) TMR = NR (5.8)
(6.3) EMR < NR (5.8)
none
Hobson, Ousten & Lee 
(1989a)





children (7;08) HMR = HNR (7;09)
(5;01)LMR = LNR (4;08)
none
Gumpel & Wilson (1996) adults No comparable MA group none
Simon et al (1996)
(Task 3)
adults No comparable MA group none



















Intelligence (IQ)  
Figure 1:Diagram detailing some of the factors involved in determining emotion perception performance of individuals 
with mental retardation. 
Factors that may determine performance include stimulus validity, secondary pathologies, domain-specific emotion sensitivity, developmental 
level (MA) and IQ-related language and information processing capacities. Matching for MA does not necessarily control for these last two 
factors. Consequently any impairment found on an emotion recognition task must be assessed in relation to a control task. If similar performance 
deficits are found in relation to MA-matched TD children on both an index and control task, then other task related factors are implicated, 
including IQ-related information processing such as those outlined by Weiss et al (1986). If a deficit is found only on the emotion recognition 
task it is still not necessarily safe to assume this is caused by a deficit in emotional sensitivity. The index and control tasks may not be equivalent 
in level of difficulty and/or the emotion recognition task may use  stimuli that are not ecologically valid. Finally, secondary pathologies may play 
a part in determining performance, particularly in older individuals.
